ORIGINALISM (2011).
9. See Jack M. Balkin, Must We Be Faithful to Original Meaning?, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 57, 70-80 (2013) .
10. Under Balkin's sophisticated account, originalism itself can incorporate this change, with originalism and living constitutionalism being seen as "two sides of the same coin." Id. at 80.
11. In her thoughtful and thought-provoking contribution to this symposium, my colleague 12. "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) . Justice Ginsburg, for example, has contended that Roe "short-circuited the development of a political groundswell that was building at the state and local level-not only on the issue of abortion-but on all phases of women's rights. such principles as will-in time, but in a rather immediate foreseeable future-gain general assent." 14 And whenever the Court acts, it should proceed with a measure of humility and caution, recognizing legitimate competing interests and minimizing its intrusion on our system of democratic self-government.
Just as American societal values have changed over time, so too have the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the Court has already expanded the Amendment far beyond what its framers and ratifiers had in mind. 15 Should the Court expand the Amendment even further, to embrace a right to same-sex marriage? Society's perspective on this issue is in a state of flux. In a notable development in 2012, President Barack Obama, citing a new understanding of his Christian faith, announced that he no longer opposes same-sex marriage but instead supports it. 16 And President Obama is not alone; the views of many Americans recently have "evolved" in the same direction.
17 Indeed, as I will discuss, there has been a remarkably rapid, and seemingly inexorable, shift of opinion from opposition to approval. So, is it time for the Court to declare a national constitutional right? Or should the Court await further, more definitive evidence of a societal consensus that is likely to be enduring? And under what form of reasoning might a Fourteenth Amendment right be justified, either now or in the future?
These questions have no easy answers. Even so, I hope to shed some light on them, especially the last one. Accordingly, I will briefly explore and evaluate three possible lines of Supreme Court reasoning, each of which might support a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage: first, substantive due process; second, heightened scrutiny equal protection; and third, rational basis equal protection coupled with a finding of illicit "animus." As we will see, each form of constitutional justification can find support in evolving national values. In my judgment, however, the first two alternatives, with primary emphasis on the second, present the best and strongest arguments for a right to same-sex marriage. By contrast, I think it would be misguided, or at least imprudent, for the Court to rely on the third line of reasoning.
14. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 239 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962). With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that Roe v. Wade did not satisfy this condition, because the Court's 1973 decision did not garner "general assent" in "a rather immediate foreseeable future." Indeed, it has yet to do so even now, some forty years later. Whether and how the Court's decision itself contributed to the ongoing controversy is a separate question. See supra note 13.
15. In the context of women's rights, for instance, the Court has discarded Fourteenth Amendment doctrine dating back to the 1870s-and presumably reflecting the framers' and ratifiers' sentiments-as "no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the Constitution." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992 17. Prior to his announcement, President Obama had stated that his views on the issue were "evolving." Id.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The substantive due process argument for same-sex marriage builds upon a line of cases beginning with the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. 18 In these cases, relying mainly on the Due Process Clause, the Court has recognized a number of unenumerated constitutional rights, including the right to conventional marriage 19 and the right of adults, including homosexuals, to engage in consensual sexual conduct. 20 At times the Court has asserted that substantive due process rights are confined to rights that "are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition'" 21 -that is, rights that have broad and longstanding historical support, as revealed in specific legal policies and social practices. 22 This backward-looking theory of historical tradition might well support the protection of conventional marriage, 23 
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In Lawrence, the Court advanced various justifications for its decision, including the Justices' own determination that criminal prohibitions on homosexual conduct violate "liberty of the person," which "presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct."
29
The Justices did not dismiss the opposing view as bigotry or intolerance, observing that it may reflect "profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles."
30 Even so, they concluded that the claim of liberty was paramount and must prevail. 31 Notably, however, the Justices emphasized that their own understanding of liberty was supported by a contemporary national consensus. Thus, the Court put aside the long history of sodomy prohibitions, both in America 26. In still other cases, especially in the context of abortion, the Court has gone even further, embracing a theory of reasoned judgment. Under this theory, the Court, through a process of political-moral reasoning, is free to recognize rights even if the rights lack widespread historical or contemporary support. The Court's various decisions thus reflect three competing theories of substantive due process: historical tradition, evolving national values, and reasoned judgment. In an earlier article, using criteria that draw upon considerations of majoritarian self-government, judicial objectivity, and functional utility, I have explored and evaluated these three theories, arguing that although each has strengths and weaknesses, the best approach, on balance, is that of evolving national values. 36 Even in these thirteen states, moreover, consensual sodomy was rarely prosecuted, suggesting that legal and social disapproval was waning. 37 The Court's decision in Lawrence, therefore, was supported by powerful evidence of a national consensus, a legal and societal consensus that had developed and endured over the course of several decades.
Is there a similar trend favoring the recognition of same-sex marriage? Yes, but this trend, to date, is far less compelling. Indeed, except in the last few years, state law making has been moving decidedly in the opposite direction, with some thirty states recently amending their state constitutions to expressly prohibit same-sex marriage. 38 In the last five years, however, it seems that the tide has turned. Not counting California, which is implementing same-sex marriage under a federal court mandate, 39 43 thus signaling a remarkable turnaround in public opinion. 44 Young people are especially supportive, and, more generally, the trend lines are strongly positive. 45 In the language of Lawrence, there may be "an emerging awareness" 46 favoring a right to same-sex marriage. For the Court to rely on such reasoning here, however, would be a matter of prediction, not the accomplished fact that was evident in Lawrence. The survey evidence certainly suggests a persistent trend, but the trend is of very recent vintage, and society has had little experience with same-sex marriage, a practice that departs from centuries of tradition and that, over time, could have unanticipated consequences. 47 Although it seems unlikely, the shift of societal opinion could slow in the face of experience, or opinion might even change directions once again.
Under the theory of evolving national values, there is a plausible argument that substantive due process supports a right to same-sex marriage. Yet this argument, standing alone, seems inadequate to the task. The Justices' own understanding of liberty, grounded in arguments of political morality, might very well support such a claim. Given the competing demands of federalism and the political process, however, the Justices should be reluctant to act merely on their own political-moral judgment. The shift in societal opinion is supportive, as is the recent pattern of state law recognition, but it seems premature to conclude that there is a national consensus on this issue, much less a consensus that is likely to be enduring. At least for now, substantive due process seems insufficient to support a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage, even under a progressive theory of evolving national values. That is, substantive due process, without more, seems insufficient. But there is more. 
II. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY EQUAL PROTECTION
As an alternative or additional argument for extending marriage to same-sex couples, the Supreme Court, not surprisingly, might turn to the Equal Protection Clause. Beyond its obvious textual appeal, equal protection is an attractive argument because the Court's existing doctrine includes precedents that can readily be extended to the same-sex marriage context. Thus, building upon its existing doctrine, the Court could conclude, as did the Second Circuit in Windsor, that discrimination based on sexual orientation is "quasi-suspect," triggering heightened scrutiny, 48 and that laws precluding gays and lesbians from marrying cannot survive this demanding review.
The central historical focus of the Equal Protection Clause was racial discrimination. 49 As Professor Archibald Cox observed, however, "Once loosed, the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." 50 Thus, the Supreme Court has treated racial discrimination as the paradigmatic "suspect classification," triggering strict judicial scrutiny and probable invalidation, 51 but it has reasoned by analogy in declaring that certain other classifications also are presumptively unconstitutional. These extensions of the Equal Protection Clause reflect a reasoned extrapolation from the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but they do not depend on the original meaning in any specific sense. Instead, they rest mainly on the Justices', and society's, changing understandings of what equality demands.
In deciding whether to treat a nonracial classification as "suspect" or "quasisuspect," the Court has invoked various criteria, but, as I will explain, three have been especially influential. First, is the classifying trait, like race, an immutable personal characteristic-an accident of birth beyond a person's control or responsibility-rendering it presumptively unjust for the government to use the trait as a basis for allocating rewards or penalties? Second, is the trait, like race, broadly irrelevant to legitimate generalization, rendering discrimination on this basis not only unfair but also indefensible in a wide range of governmental settings? And third, is the disadvantaged group, like African Americans and other racial minorities, a group that lacks political power and that therefore warrants special judicial solicitude, that is, special protection from the ordinary operation of the political process?
In addressing gender discrimination, for instance, the Supreme Court, acting more than a century after the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, moved from its 49. Indeed, as the Supreme Court declared shortly after their ratification, all three of the post-Civil War Amendments were animated by "one pervading purpose": "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1873 that any racial classification is "immediately suspect" and demands "strict scrutiny," which renders the classification invalid unless it is "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest"). traditional deferential stance 52 to a vigorous form of heightened scrutiny (albeit falling short of the full strict scrutiny that applies to race). In so doing, the Court made gender discrimination "quasi-suspect," for reasons best articulated in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson. 53 As Brennan explained, gender is substantially similar to race under each of the three criteria that I have outlined: first, it is an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth"; 54 second, it "frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society"; 55 and third, women not only suffered historically from political disadvantages 56 but also (at least in 1973, when Frontiero was decided) continued to "face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination," including "in the political arena." 57 Accordingly, as the Court later held, genderbased classifications require an "exceedingly persuasive justification" 58 and violate equal protection unless they "serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives." 59 Using similar reasoning, the Court has also extended strict or heightened scrutiny to classifications based on alienage and illegitimacy. 60 The Supreme Court's three-part analysis calls for judgments of fact and value, judgments that directly address political-moral questions of justice and fairness as well as the judiciary's role in redressing failures in the political process. At the same time, however, the Court's extensions of the Equal Protection Clause-for example, to protect women and illegitimate children from historically sanctioned forms of discrimination-generally have tracked the changing values of society itself. In Frontiero, for example, even as he cited the continuing political disadvantages faced by women, Justice Brennan found support for heightened scrutiny in the very fact that Congress itself, reflecting the shifting values of the day, recently had "manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications." 61 More broadly, speaking in a later case, Justice Marshall candidly observed that "constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and due process, evolve over time. Under the three-factor inquiry, the argument for extending heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation is straightforward. First, it is increasingly clear that for the vast majority of individuals, sexual orientation is immutable, not a matter of choice. 64 Thus, under the first criterion, sexual orientation is a good fit, albeit not perfect. Second, as with gender, sexual orientation, in most legal settings, is an invalid basis for generalization and therefore for governmental policy making. Even if sexual orientation is relevant to certain issues, perhaps including marriage, these issues are few and far between. As a result, the second criterion is readily satisfied. And third, as the Second Circuit concluded in Windsor, the political position of gays and lesbians today is analogous to that of women at the time of Frontiero: Having endured a long history of prejudice and disadvantage, they have made considerable progress, "but they still 'face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . in the political arena.'" 65 As a result, it remains difficult for homosexuals "to politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination,"
66 suggesting that the judiciary should play an active role under the Equal Protection Clause.
Simultaneously, also as in Frontiero, there is evidence of a shift in societal values that may support an evolving principle of equality that demands heightened scrutiny in this context. As with gender discrimination at the time of Frontiero, Congress recently has shown at least some "increasing sensitivity" 67 to sexual orientation discrimination, acting in 2009 to extend special federal protection to victims of violence based on sexual orientation 68 and in 2010 to repeal the discriminatory military policy known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." 69 Many states have gone further, adopting antidiscrimination laws and policies in a variety of settings, including employment and housing. 70 More generally, Americans are increasingly tolerant of homosexuality, in part because they are coming to agree that it is indeed an accident of birth. 71 Thus, just as Theodore Olson argued in response to Justice Scalia's vexing question of "when," it may be that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause changed "when we-as a culture determined that sexual orientation is a characteristic of individuals that they cannot control." 72 Even if Americans remain divided on the particular question of same-sex marriage, their more general shift of opinion-reflected to a significant degree in legal changes at the federal and state levels-tends to support a new understanding of equal protection, an understanding that in turn may bear on the issue of marriage.
Over time, changing societal attitudes about gays and lesbians may undermine the argument that they are politically disadvantaged and therefore warrant special judicial solicitude. For now, however, it appears that homosexuals continue to face sufficient prejudice and disadvantage to satisfy the third part of the three-factor analysis. At the same time, this lingering political handicap makes their political successes, with respect to same-sex marriage and more generally, all the more remarkable and all the more indicative of evolving societal values. As with gender at the time of Frontiero, then, there is a strong argument that discrimination based on sexual orientation, including prohibitions on same-sex marriage, should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, an active judicial role may be especially appropriate in vindicating a right to same-sex marriage because most of the prohibitions are embodied in state constitutional amendments, thus removing them from the ordinary process of political change.
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If the gender formulation of heightened scrutiny is applied, same-sex marriage prohibitions cannot survive in the absence of an "exceedingly persuasive justification," 74 which requires the government to demonstrate that they "serve important governmental objectives and [are] substantially related to [the] achievement of those objectives."
75 By every indication, no such justification exists. As discussed below, it may very well be rational and reasonable to restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples, but that is not enough to satisfy heightened scrutiny. To be sure, there are governmental objectives that could qualify as "important"-notably, encouraging responsible procreation and sound childrearing-but these objectives are likely to falter under the "substantial relationship" requirement, because there is little evidence that same-sex marriage prohibitions substantially advance these objectives. 76 Justifications along these lines, however reasonable, simply are not "exceedingly persuasive." As a result, heightened scrutiny equal protection strongly supports the invalidation of these prohibitions and therefore a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage.
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III. RATIONAL BASIS EQUAL PROTECTION AND ILLICIT "ANIMUS"
As we have seen, there is a plausible argument that substantive due process supports a right to same-sex marriage, and there is a far stronger argument that equal protection supports such a right, on the ground that classifications based on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect, calling for heightened scrutiny that marriage prohibitions cannot survive. Each argument is informed by evolving societal values, and the two arguments can work in tandem. Taken together, but with equal protection doing most of the work, these arguments can readily justify a Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage.
There is a third potential basis for a right to same-sex marriage, also grounded in equal protection but not requiring a declaration that classifications based on sexual orientation are quasi-suspect. 78 Instead, the Supreme Court, extending its reasoning in Windsor, could conclude that state law prohibitions on same-sex marriage are invalid even under rational basis scrutiny because they reflect an unconstitutional "animus" toward gays and lesbians, that is, "a bare . In the context of marriage, this line of reasoning might be supported in part by evolving national values, on the view that society is coming to regard opposition to same-sex marriage as not merely wrong but illegitimate-the product of antiquated and untenable prejudice and bigotry. This perspective is not implausible. As discussed earlier, there is a long history of bias against homosexuals, and this bias surely has played a role in the continuing opposition to same-sex marriage. But there are less pernicious grounds for supporting the conventional approach to marriage, and, even as societal thinking about homosexuality has evolved, it is hardly apparent that prejudice or bias is the exclusive or dominant motivation in this particular setting. As a result, the notion that evolving values support the view that marriage restrictions are animus-based is, at best, highly contentious. More generally, in my view, the Court was wrong to rely on animus reasoning in Windsor, and, in any event, it should not extend this reasoning to state laws that affirm the traditional approach to marriage.
In Windsor, the Court nullified section 3 of DOMA, a 1996 statute declaring that, regardless of state law, "marriage" under federal law was confined to opposite-sex couples. 83 In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court invoked various considerations, including federalism 84 and hints of substantive due process. 85 The Court's primary argument, however, was that Congress had acted with illicit "animus," thus violating equal protection. 86 Because it declined to adopt heightened scrutiny, the Court necessarily concluded-albeit without serious discussion-that section 3 could not survive rational basis review, that is, that it did not rationally serve any legitimate governmental interest. 87 Otherwise, the Court could not have concluded, as it did, that DOMA was animated by "a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group." 88 In fact, however, as noted by the Windsor dissenters, section 3 did serve interests that appear to be perfectly legitimate, and it did so in an entirely rational manner. Most obviously, it preserved, within the federal domain, an approach to marriage that had prevailed throughout history and that continues to reflect a reasoned-albeit now contested-understanding of this important institution. 89 It likewise advanced interests in legal stability and uniformity, 90 and it avoided difficult choice-of-law questions, questions that now will arise precisely because this provision has been nullified. 91 In reality, the Court could not invalidate section 3 under ordinary rational basis principles. Rather, it seems clear that the Court applied a version of heightened scrutiny. But it did so sub silencio, and therefore without a stated justification.
As I have explained, there is a strong argument that laws discriminating against gays and lesbians, including section 3 of DOMA, should indeed be subject to heightened scrutiny. But there is little to be said for judicial obfuscation. Justice Marshall's observation concerning an earlier "animus" ruling is equally fitting here: "[I]t is important to articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles that justify subjecting [a law] to the searching review-the heightened scrutinythat actually leads to its invalidation. 100 This is an especially disturbing charge when, as here, the judicial insult is gratuitous, because the Court could readily have reached the same result in another, far more persuasive manner: by candidly adopting heightened scrutiny and invalidating section 3 on that basis.
When the question turns from DOMA to state laws, moreover, there are additional reasons for avoiding animus-based reasoning. In the first place, the statelaw context eliminates the federalism concern that was present in Windsor and that the Court directly linked to its animus rationale. (describing opposition to homosexual conduct as a product not of animus or bigotry but rather of "profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles").
